The myth of Soviet expansionism after WWII(4)
Before the use of the atomic bomb by the United States, before the creation of Nato, before Western and West German rearmament before the spiralling and debilitating arms race had seized hold of Europe, the Soviet Union and communism were adequately and effectively “contained” by the greater and more vastly extended power of U.S. And this was fully realized by by the very man who was the foremost proponent of a rearmed and re-miliatrized world who attempt to to revive the military will of atom-blasted Japan. In March 1949, John Foster Dulles declared “the Soviet Government, under conditions now prevailing, does not contemplate the use of war as an instrument of its national policy. I do not know any responsible official, military or civilian in this government or any Government who believes that the Soviet Government now plans conquest by open military aggression” Dulles statement is corroborated by more than half a dozen estimates of America leaders from 1946 to 1949 cited in the Forestal Diaries. On June 10, 1946, Forestall himself wrote that he thought the Russians “would not move this summer in fact at any time” On August 3, 1948, two months after Berlin Blockade, General Walter bided Smith ambassador to the Soviet Union reported to the War Council his impression ” that the Russians do not want war” and of course Kennan who was Chairman of the Policy planning staff at the State department had been categorical on this question “I cannot think of a time when the Soviet Government desired that there should be such a conflict(war with the West) planned to launch it .
Undoubtedly, as showed by Gar Alperovitz’s Atomic diplomacy, the main reasons behind the mass killing in the two Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on August 6 and 9, 1945, were political and that the A-bomb used to Japan before Russia could enter the war Against Japan and in the long run to restrict Russia’s gains and voice in the Far East.Indeed, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, American highest military authorities, the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders and Survey’s opinion produced detailed investigations of all the facts showing that certainly prior to December 31, 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped even if Russia had not entered the war and even if no invasion had been planned . Even Secretary of States Byrne has also admitted that the bomb did not end the war that Japan was beaten and suing for peace when it was dropped. At the time the bomb was used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki Japan was exhausted because of the destruction of her navy and her air force, Japan cities and industries were being destroyed at will . It was apparent even to headline readers that Japanese resistance could not continue much longer. On July the daily news releases made it plain that japan was defeated.
As has been showed by Gar Alporowitz, the first goal of using the atomic bomb was rather political than militarily directed against the Soviet Union in order to minimize her gains both in Eastern Europe and the Far East. When economic coercion failed to achieve United States goals in eastern Europe, Truman bided his time until acquiring the atomic bomb with which he meant to cow the Russians into submission the sue of nuclear weapon aganst an already defeated Japan amounted to a diplomatic rather than a military act. the bombs were used primarily to demonstrate to the Russians the enormous power America would have in its possession during subsequent negotiations. Up to this time control of eastern Europe had seemed vital to the Russians as a means of preventing a German come-back. Now the same region was even more vital as buffer against the atomic-armed West. the wish for the United States to end the war quickly before the Russians could establish a strong position in the Far East. As it was the case in eastern Europe, Stalin was trying to attain for the Soviet Union its legitimate security needs in the face of increasing American militance.